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Abstract
This paper presents evidence that the majority of the high post-recession
unemployment rates is the result of an increase in the natural rate, rather
than cyclical deviations from it. Moreover, I discuss the likely causes of the
recent increases in the natural rate. Since most of the theorized causes of
increases appear transitory in nature, I expect that the natural rate will soon
decline, followed closely by a decrease in actual unemployment rates.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recently, there has been much debate in the economics literature regarding
structural shifts in the U.S. labor market. The existence of a larger structural
component also implies a higher natural rate of unemployment and, simi-
larly, a higher non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).1
Such changes can subsequently result in prolonged increases in the actual
unemployment rate. This debate persists due to the fact that it is difficult
to disentangle the cyclical unemployment rate from the structural compo-
nent.
Given the difficulty in estimating the natural rate, there is much contro-
versy surrounding its level and whether it has changed. On one side of the
debate, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke has publicly stated that he
believes the natural rate remains around 5.5%. In fact, at the 2012 annual
monetary policy symposium, Bernanke remarked,
1These terms are fairly substitutable in the current literature so I will be using them
interchangeably throughout the remainder of this thesis. Other terms that are equivalent
are equilibrium unemployment rate and unemployment rate at full employment.
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“I see little evidence of substantial structural change in recent
years . . . Following every previous U.S. recession since World
War II, the unemployment rate has returned close to its pre-
recession level.” (Spencer, 2012)
In recent testimony before Congress, Bernanke restated the point that
the current U.S. unemployment rate is substantially above the target natu-
ral rate:
“Despite these gains, the jobs situation is far from satisfactory,
as the unemployment rate remains well above its longer-run
normal level, and rates of underemployment and long-term un-
employment are still much too high.” (Testimony of Ben Bernanke,
2013)
Indeed, the Federal Reserves official predictions lie between 5.2% and
6.0%, thereby explaining the Chairman’s estimates (Federal Reserve Bank,
2013).
At the other end of the spectrum, Pimco co-CIOs Mohamed El-Erian
and Bill Gross predict a natural rate of approximately 7% (Kennedy, Matthews,
& Zumbrun, 2012). To help put the wide scope of these estimates into per-
spective, the standard deviation of the unemployment rate since 1948 has
only been 1.6 percentage points whereas expert estimates of the natural rate
range from 5.2% to 7%.
Correctly estimating the natural rate, or at least the structural compo-
nent of unemployment, is essential from a policy perspective since only
3cyclical factors of unemployment respond to short-run fiscal and mone-
tary policies. Hence, having an accurate unemployment rate target for
the central bank is crucial for the development of counter-cyclical policies.
Without such a target, policy makers would not be able to formulate ap-
propriate monetary and fiscal stimuli effectively. If the Federal Reserve is
aiming for a significantly lower unemployment rate than the natural rate,
most macroeconomic models suggest that this will produce higher infla-
tion rates. Paraphrasing ideas found originally in Keynes (1923), we can
reach full employment by expanding the money supply, but if the central
bank expands it by too much, inflation results. Indeed, Stiglitz (1997) found
that keeping the unemployment rate as much as one percentage below the
NAIRU for one year will result in inflation rate increases of between 0.3
and 0.6 percentage points.
The goal of this thesis is to assess how much, if any, of the higher post-
recession unemployment rate is due to a permanently higher natural rate.
To do this, I follow the sectoral variance approach, first proposed by Lilien
(1982), to estimate a natural rate series using national time series. I then
expand the analysis by using state-level panels, and state-level time series
regressions. I also briefly analyze explanations that focus on a Beveridge
curve approach regarding movements in the natural rate. Looking at out-
comes from these different methodologies, this thesis will evaluate whether
and how this recession and its subsequent recovery are different from other
previous post World War II events. In the latter portion of this analysis, I
discuss the three primary factors that economists have offered as explana-
tion for a higher natural rate: mismatch, unemployment insurance exten-
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sions, and uncertainty. Ultimately, I determine that the natural rate rose
substantially over the recent recession and is beginning to decrease again.
This will result in lower actual unemployment rates going forward.
This thesis proceeds as follows: first I present background information
as to why this debate has arisen and, in the process, elaborate on the con-
cept of the natural rate. Next, I present an in depth literature review of the
preceding methodologies followed by a theoretical investigation into the
parameters that affect the unemployment rate. Lastly, I include an empiri-
cal specification and discuss the explanations, conclusions, and limitations
of my results.
Chapter 2
Background
Relative to the three most recent recessions of 1981, 1990, and 2001, unem-
ployment rates rose sharply throughout the Great Recession in the U.S. The
increase from a low of 4.4% in May 2007 to a high of 10.0% in October 20092
surprised many economists: the peak unemployment rate was significantly
higher than they had predicted. Perhaps most famously, Larry Summers,
the former Director of President Obama’s National Economic Council and,
until this fall, the leading candidate for the Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve, forecasted that unemployment rates would peak at 8.5% (Geraghty,
2009). Trying to find the source of such a serious underprediction, I re-
gressed the change in the unemployment rate on real GDP growth from
1948 to 2007, using annual data. The point estimate forecast for 2008 from
this regression is 6.1% assuming the realized subsequent decline in GDP of
0.3%. Extending this process to 2009, with GDP decreasing by an additional
2Note that the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) dated the recession as
lasting from December 2007 to June 2009.
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2.8% (few expected the recession to be that severe), the unemployment
rate forecast would have been 8.6%, thereby matching Summers’ result.
Since the standard error of regression (SER) is 0.5 percentage points, the
actual unemployment rate peak is almost three standard deviations away
from the 2008 prediction. This suggests a breakdown or structural break in
Okun’s Law, which is perhaps indicative of instability in other long-held
relationships as well. One conclusion may be that we have entered a “new
regime” and that this brave new world is fundamentally different from our
previous experience. If this is the case, then it will become harder to fore-
cast economic variables with any useful accuracy and find stable economic
relationships for the post 2007 period.
Figure 1 hints at the presence of such a structural break: the 2007-2009
recession initially appeared similar, if not milder, than the two Great Mod-
eration recessions of 1990 and 2001. Moreover, there was certainly no indi-
cation that this downturn would resemble the most severe post-World War
II (Volcker) recession of 1981, which is included for comparison. However,
this changed in September 2008 with the bankruptcy of the Lehman Broth-
ers investment bank, at which point U.S. unemployment increased rapidly.
Only then did it become evident that we were in the midst of something
much more serious. Although the 1981 recession was severe, the recovery
from the monetary contraction was relatively quick. Pre-recession employ-
ment levels were reached in less than 30 months. In stark contrast, more
than four years after the end of the Great Recession, current employment
levels have still not returned to those seen in December 2007 (Figure 1).
The unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high for this stage of
7the recovery; it has declined by only 2.5 percentage points during the four
plus years since the end of the recession in June 2009. Moreover, the anemic
rate of increase in employment has barely outpaced labor force growth over
the last two years. Given this lackluster increase in employment, it is not
altogether surprising that the unemployment rate has still not declined to
its pre-recession level. Clearly, this recovery from a financial crisis is very
different in terms of labor market movements in the unemployment rate
and job creation.
The picture gets worse once you consider the long-term unemployed.
These are individuals who have been unemployed for more than half a
year, the time by which unemployment insurance benefits are terminated
during normal economic times.3 Their numbers have been significantly
higher by historical standards. Figure 2a displays a time series plot of the
long-term unemployment rate (the number of people who are long-term
3The maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits has been extended to as
long as 99 weeks multiple times during and after the recent recession.
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unemployed as a percentage of the total labor force) since 1948. Figure 2b
shows long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment.
Both figures indicate a recent and unusually large increase in long-term
unemployment, both in absolute and percentage terms, relative to the last
60 years.
The unemployment rate for labor force participants in this category
reached a high of 4.2% in April 2010 (Figure 2a), a full six months after
the unemployment rate peaked. This compares to the previous maxima of
1.6% in the aftermath of the 1990 recession and 2.4% following the 1981 re-
cession. Additionally, over a three year period (December 2010 to Novem-
ber 2012), individuals who had been unemployed for 27 weeks or more
made up more than 40% of all those unemployed (Figure 2b). This is a
much larger share compared to the previous postwar peaks: the percent
of long-term unemployed to the total was 25.7%, 21.5%, and 22.7% follow-
ing the 1981, 1990, and 2001 recessions, respectively. This means that this
ratio was almost twice as high after this recession which serves as a po-
tential explanation for fundamental changes in employability during the
current recovery period. Levine (2013) attributes this phenomenon to a
9loss of employee-employer relations that may induce a positive feedback
loop as workers remain unemployed for a more extensive period of time.
The longer people experience spells of unemployment, the more their use-
ful work skills decline. Such depreciation of human capital makes these
workers even less desirable to potential employers and thereby keeps them
unemployed for longer. This downward spiral can continue to the point
where gainful employment for many long-term unemployed becomes in-
creasingly improbable.
The unemployment rate will decrease if employment growth outpaces
labor force growth. Hence, if discouraged workers leave the labor force,
it is possible for the unemployment rate to decline without any increase
in the actual number of individuals employed. To eliminate this so-called
“discouraged worker effect” from distorting the labor market picture, Fig-
ure 3 presents a time series plot of the employment to population ratio,
with teenagers broken out separately. Although both the overall popula-
tion and teenagers saw a sharp decline in this ratio during the recession,
teenagers were clearly hit harder.
The teenage employment to population ratio dropped from 37.4% in
June 2006 to 25.2% in May 2011 (Figure 3). This represents a record low for
the postwar period. Moreover, after this large decline within a relatively
short timeframe, the ratio has remained around 26% without any indica-
tion of a return to previous levels in the near future. Compared to the
three prior recessions, this is atypical given how far into the recovery we
are. This trend decline is significant since, as mentioned above, extended
periods of unemployment lead to a depreciation of skills and a probable de-
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crease in future employment options.4 One plausible explanation as to why
teenagers are most affected is that many teenage workers tend to work in
entry-level service jobs which become increasingly redundant during eco-
nomic downturns and their aftermaths. Another possibility is that older
workers have displaced these teenagers. Although there was a significant
fall recently in teenage employment, there has also been a downward trend
since 1982 (see the dashed trend line in Figure 3) which could explain part
of this steep decline, but not the bulk of it.
Even more alarming than these employment incongruities in themselves
is that real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had returned to its pre-recession
level by the second quarter of 20115 while the unemployment rate, as dis-
cussed above, has not. Historically, GDP growth and unemployment rate
4This topic will be discussed in further detail in the hysteresis paragraph of the literature
review.
5Note that this does not project normal growth of GDP forward beyond the onset of the
recession; it just indicates we have reached where we were in 2005. Furthermore, note that
per capita GDP has not returned to its pre-recession level. For that matter, it has not even
reached its 2005 level, almost turning this past 10 years into a “lost decade.”
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changes have moved according to a relatively tight relationship described
by Okun’s Law which has a correlation coefficient of 0.87. Hence, it is odd
that an increase in the growth of real output has not led to a greater decline
in the national unemployment rate (Figure 4).
In Figure 4, blue points represent values for the period 2007-2012, inclu-
sive. Red points are annual values for the period 1948 to 2006. The fitted
green line displays the historical relationship between the change in the
unemployment rate and growth in real GDP for the United States prior to
the first year of the Great Recession. The orange regression line represents
the fitted values for the Great Recession and subsequent “Not-So-Great re-
covery”. This relationship appears much steeper than that for the previous
period. This suggests a structural break: to reduce the unemployment rate
by one percentage point now requires real GDP to grow by less than the
amount needed in the past. This also indicates that if real GDP growth falls
by one percentage point, the unemployment rate will increase by more than
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it would have done previously. This explains why many econometricians
under-predicted the unemployment rate peak, because they did not have
the data we now have from which they could have determined that this
fundamental relationship had changed.
Although there are only a few points making up the “new trend” sam-
ple, they display a strong divergence from the historical correlation and,
therefore, indicate an inherent breakdown in Okun’s Law.6 I performed a
Chow test to ensure that the coefficients are indeed different. With an F-
statistic of 2.76, it rejected the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level,
thereby confirming that a statistically significant structural break did oc-
cur. One plausible explanation for this anomaly is that productivity has
increased. If this is the case, fewer people are now needed to produce a
given level of output. So for the same output, unemployment would now
be even higher than expected given the decline in GDP.
These examples reinforce the notion that this recession and recovery
have been, and continue to be, very different from previous experiences.
One reason for this is that a recovery from a monetary contraction, as in
the 1981 Volker recession, and indeed most post-World War II recessions, is
unlike a recovery from a financial crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). In ad-
dition, the anomalously high and persistent unemployment rate and break-
downs in commonly-accepted economic relationships suggest that the un-
employment rate may now contain a larger structural component that may
persist post-recovery. If this is the case, then the labor market consequences
6Note that some economists believe that the decline in the unemployment rate observed
during the first quarter of 2011 has brought the unemployment and output gaps back in
line with the historical Okun’s Law relationship (Daly, Hobijn, Sahin, & Valletta, 2012).
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of the recent recession and recovery may need to be remedied in a different
fashion. Since short-run stabilization policies are not designed to alleviate
structural unemployment and can be extremely costly if misapplied, this
possibility has important policy implications.
If the unemployment rate is below the natural rate for an extended pe-
riod of time, this can lead to higher inflation. Figure 5a displays the move-
ments in the inflation rate and the unemployment rate-NAIRU gap since
1948. Note that when the gap is high, either in the positive or negative di-
rection, the inflation rate is greatly affected. This lends emphasis to the fact
that this natural rate topic is important from the perspective of maintaining
a stable inflation rate. Figure 5b relates the information in Figure 5a back
to the Phillips curve, changing the left hand axis to the change in inflation
rather than inflation itself.7 This figure displays the clear negative rela-
tionship between cyclical unemployment and the change in inflation; dur-
ing expansions, the cyclical unemployment gap is negative and inflation
increases whereas during downturns, for example during the Volker Re-
cession, cyclical unemployment greatly increases while inflation decreases
(Figure 5b).
To assist in the understanding of the natural rate, the following section
(2.1) will cover its initial derivation. Section 2.2 will consider more recent
adaptations and improvements that make it a more accurate and reliable
measure.
7If there are “static expectations”, with inflationary expectations able to be measured
by the previous period’s inflation rate, then the left hand side variable of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve would be the change in the inflation rate.
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2.1 The “Optimal” Unemployment Rate as Derived from
the Original Phillips Curve
In 1958, A. W. Phillips derived the Phillips curve which inversely relates
the unemployment rate and nominal wage growth. In other words, there
is a widely-accepted view of a correlation between a low unemployment
rate and a high rate of inflation8 and vice versa. This implicit short-run
tradeoff makes the Federal Reserve’s job of keeping both inflation and the
unemployment rate low9 a challenging balancing act.
Assuming static expectations, the original Phillips curve can be repre-
sented as follows:
wt = −b
(
U − U)+ v (1a)
where nominal wage growth (wt) is a negative function of cyclical un-
employment, (U−U ), and supply shocks and other shocks to the market, v.
8I assume some price mark-up occurs.
9The Federal Reserve’s stated objectives are ”maximum employment, stable prices,
and moderate long-term interest rates” according to public law for Congress §225a
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/225a)
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Cyclical unemployment is the gap between the actual unemployment rate,
U , and the natural rate of unemployment, U .
One Keynesian-type interpretation is that when this measure is posi-
tive, there are more workers willing to work at the prevailing wage than
there are jobs available (“wait unemployment”). In this framework, the
Federal Reserve can affect the unemployment rate and, therefore, the amount
of cyclical unemployment. This is done through stimulatory monetary and
fiscal policies that increase aggregate demand and, hence, the amount of
jobs available. The structural component of unemployment, or the natural
rate, on the other hand, is the equilibrium result determined by real supply
and demand factors in the labor market. As will be discussed in greater
detail in the theory of unemployment section, these factors adjust with real
wages, rather than nominal wages and, hence, federal stimuli do not affect
their long-run values. In other words, the central bank can influence cycli-
cal unemployment, but it has no control of structural unemployment. This
relationship reinforces the importance of having a solid numerical estimate
of the natural rate: it is only when the Federal Reserve has such knowledge
that it can implement economic policy measures which minimize cyclical
unemployment without overshooting and expending unnecessary funds.
Not only does Equation 1a offer valuable insights into the different com-
ponents of the unemployment rate, but it also reinforces the notion that
wages and, hence, inflation theoretically increases if the unemployment
rate remains too far below the natural rate. In this scenario, the U.S. would
have consistently negative cyclical unemployment. Given the negative re-
lationship between cyclical unemployment and prices, a persistent nega-
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tive gap should lead to greater wage and price inflation, assuming that this
long-held relationship persists.
During the 1970s, however, inflation was not a great concern because, in
accordance with the classical theory of money neutrality, people assumed
that real wages would remain constant or only grow at the rate of produc-
tivity increases as nominal wages increased with the prices of goods. As a
result, the published “optimal” rate of inflation hovered between 3% and
4%, with a desired unemployment rate of 4%. For instance, in response
to recessionary fears, the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act was
signed into law by President Carter in 1978. It set a numerical unemploy-
ment rate target of 3% for persons over 20 years of age and an inflation
target of 4% (Humphrey Hawkins Full Employment Act, 1978). To put
these values into perspective, the current Federal Reserve target is 2% in-
flation. One reason why the target is not zero is that the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) tends to be overstated due to the substitution and quality bi-
ases (Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches, & Jorgenson, 1998). Addition-
ally, inflation has beneficial buffering qualities: employers and policy mak-
ers can use it to effectively reduce real wages without decreasing nominal
wages and thereby upsetting the general workforce. This effect occurs due
to the idea of money illusion in which people tend to think of currency in
nominal, rather than real, terms (Fisher, 1928; 108). Hence, if inflation in-
creased without corresponding nominal wages movements, real purchas-
ing power per hour worked would decrease without workers taking much
note.
In the late 1960s, Phillips curve theory, as initially posited without in-
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flationary expectations, began to break down. In fact, Edmund Phelps and
Milton Friedman independently challenged its theoretical underpinnings
in subsequent years (Phelps, 1967; Friedman, 1968). It was their works
which resulted in the currently accepted relationship between the accel-
eration in inflation and cyclical unemployment, without forcing the con-
dition of static expectations. Friedman (1968) argued that the original re-
lationship would not hold and, therefore, would not remain an effective
tool in influencing the economy unless the central bank was able to in-
crease inflation by more than expectations each time it tried to stimulate
the economy. Friedman reasoned that workers and firms would build in-
flationary expectations into their contracts. In essence, employers would
raise prices in accordance with their inflation forecasts or expectations. As
such, money neutrality would swing into effect and no employment gains
would result unless the Federal Reserve had raised inflation by more than
expected; to be effective as an economic policy tool, wage inflation and
inflationary expectations would have to lag actual inflation in perpetuity.
Theoretically, this inherently necessitates ever higher inflation to create em-
ployment gains.
The stagflation of the 1960s and 1970s is a prime example of this oc-
curring. The Federal Reserve attempted to reduce unemployment by in-
creasing inflation, but agents on both sides of the market saw through this
and the U.S. ended up with extremely high inflation rates and very little
economic growth (Kollewe, 2011). All in all, the Phillips curve became re-
branded as the Expectations-Augmented Phillips curve (EAPC) and had
the following slightly modified equation:
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pi = pie − b (U − U)+ v (1b)
The only difference from Equation 1a is that price expectations, pie, are
now built in. Assuming static expectations and subtracting the lagged in-
flation rate from both sides:
4pi = −b (U − U)+ v (1c)
Both Friedman and Phelps greatly contributed to macroeconomic the-
ory and have since been award Nobel Prizes in Economics for their works.
The new ”ideal” unemployment rate, or the natural rate which Friedman
introduced, will be discussed in the following section.
2.2 Friedman’s Natural Rate and the NAIRU
Friedman found supportive evidence that inflation accelerates before full
employment is reached. Therefore, he posited that we should strive for the
lowest unemployment rate that does not result in a spiraling upward rate
of inflation; in his 1968 paper, he introduced the concept of a natural rate:
“At any moment of time, there is some level of unemployment
which has the property that it is consistent with equilibrium
in the structure of real wages . . . The ‘natural rate of unem-
ployment’ . . . is the level that would be ground out by the
Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided
there is embedded in them the actual structural characteristics
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of the labour and commodity markets, including market im-
perfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the
costs of gathering information about job vacancies, and labor
availabilities, the costs of mobility, and so on.” (Friedman, 1968).
Essentially, unemployment is a phenomenon that can be understood
within a general equilibrium model, provided that the model is suitably
extended. This implies that there is only one equilibrium level of output
and employment at a given moment in time, given a specific set of input
parameters that affect labor demand and supply. Furthermore, by defining
it as an equilibrium, Friedman suggests that the long-term unemployment
rate is not a constant, and can therefore change if the labor demand and
supply curves affecting the input parameters shift. I will address these two
points in further detail in the theory of unemployment section.
The natural rate is the rate of unemployment that remains after business
cycle fluctuations, termed cyclical unemployment, are considered. Fried-
man used it as a way to distinguish between cyclical changes that monetary
policy can affect, and structural changes that it cannot. Essentially, it can be
viewed as the long-run unemployment rate that the economy reaches once
it is in a resting equilibrium. As such, it is the unemployment that results
from all sources except fluctuations in aggregate demand. Rather than la-
beling it a “natural” rate, many econometricians prefer to call it the NAIRU
because this term does not imply that any unemployment is acceptable.
This being said, the official definition of the NAIRU is the equilibrium un-
employment rate at which the change in inflation is zero (Hoover, 2012;
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593). As mentioned previously, however, the two are approximately syn-
onymous in practice. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the United
States’ most cited source of NAIRU estimates, calculates an average NAIRU
of 5.62% over 1948-2006 (Figure 6).
Figure 6 shows estimates of both the short-term and long-term NAIRUs.
The major difference between the two estimates is that the CBO adjusts
the second for structural factors that are likely only temporarily boosting
the natural rate. The Federal Reserve appear to be operating under the
assumption that the NAIRU has not changed, even in the short-term.
Next, I will discuss the components of the natural rate. In itself, the
natural rate of unemployment contains both a frictional as well as a struc-
tural component. Frictional “wait” unemployment is the unemployment
that remains even when the economy is at the business cycle peak (Hoover,
2012; 451). This is the job-search unemployment that occurs due to people
looking for desirable work; even in good times, there are people transition-
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ing between jobs or searching for ones that may be a better fit. Structural
unemployment, on the other hand, is caused by labor market rigidities in
the form of skills mismatches (Hoover, 2012; 468). It is the unemployment
that arises when there is a fundamental disparity between the skills work-
ers who are actively seeking work possess and those that firms with open
positions want. Hence, it is affected by labor market inefficiencies, such as
imperfect information, as well as any underlying changes in the skill set
demanded by employers or offered by job seekers. The recent recession
may have impacted these noncyclical factors, causing an inherent increase
in the natural rate.

Chapter 3
Literature Review
Some economists do not believe that a NAIRU even exists (see Eisner 1994;
Galbraith 1995). For instance, in a 1994 Los Angeles Times article, Robert
Eisner, past president of the American Economic Association, wrote:
“But this is a doctrine with little or no consistent factual sup-
port. Unemployment in the United States has bounced all around
its so-called natural rate with no indications of permanently ac-
celerating inflation from our episodes of low unemployment.”
(Eisner, 1994).
Other econometricians support this view: they do not find any signif-
icant correlation between the unemployment-NAIRU gap and persistent
inflation. While acknowledging that there is a relationship in the short-
term (as Figure 5a shows), they do not feel that a large gap will result with
a long spell of higher inflation. John Kenneth Galbraith, who served as an
economic advisor for four U.S. presidents, was likewise skeptical of natural
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rate theory. In his 1995 article he wrote:
“That 5.5 to 6 percent consensus is easily explained: it’s where
the actual unemployment rate is. And that has usually been
true: the estimated NAIRU tracks actual unemployment. When
unemployment goes up, conservative economists raise their NAIRU.
When it falls, they predict inflation, and if inflation doesn’t hap-
pen they cut their estimated NAIRU. There is a long and not-
very-reputable literature of such estimates – you can look it up.
In fact, this little corner of the professional record is embarrass-
ing.” (Galbraith, 1995).
These two prominent economists hold views that resonate with very
classical economics; in classical models, one is always at the intersection
of the labor demand and labor supply curves. If this is the case, there is
no cyclical unemployment, and the natural rate should perfectly track the
actual unemployment rate.
Hyper-classical theorists extend this theory to the extremes with some
even believing that the Great Depression should really have been called the
Great Vacation. They claim that the unemployed were choosing leisure
rather than accepting the real wages that prevailed in the market which,
presumably, represented the real value of their labor at the time. In fact,
while not quite as extreme, Keynes believed it should have been terms the
Great Misunderstanding. Real wages rose significantly as a result of prices
falling after a large contraction in the money supply. This increase was
only party counteracted by decreases in workers’ nominal wages. Only
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seeing the cuts in their nominal wages and not realizing the increase in
their purchasing power, workers began withholding their supply of labor
by incorrectly assuming their nominal wage cuts signified a reduction in
their living standards (Williams, 2012). In reality, however, more workers
were being involuntarily laid-off than voluntarily quitting.
Lilien (1982; 791) offers a possible explanation for holding this view-
point, “[s]ince the widespread acceptance of the natural rate hypothesis,
economists have come to view cyclical unemployment as deviations of
unemployment from some relatively stable natural rate.” The key point
here is that these economists view the NAIRU as being stable. This is fur-
ther confirmed by the CBO’s calculations of the natural rate, with it barely
fluctuating over time (Figure 6). While there are many who support this
commonly-held view, “[t]here is nothing in this literature to suggest that
the equilibrium unemployment will be time invariant.” (Lilien, 1982; 791)
There are others who believe that most or all of the observed patterns
in the higher unemployment rate are only cyclical. Lazaer and Spletzer
(2012) recognize that mismatch increased during the recent recession but
believe that it has already retreated at the same rate. For their empirical
specification, they constructed a measure of industry mismatch by calculat-
ing the unemployment-vacancy gap as a percentage of those employed in
the industry as a whole. This allowed them to decompose the unemploy-
ment rate into its structural and cyclical components based upon indus-
try makeup. They determined that the patterns observed were “consistent
with unemployment being caused by cyclic phenomena that are more pro-
nounced during the current recession than in prior recessions” (Lazaer and
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Spletzer, 2012; 2). Furthermore, they felt that the time for the unemploy-
ment rate to increase from 4.4% in the Spring of 2007 to 10.0% in October of
2009 was not enough for any permanent structural change to occur. They
conclude their paper with the prediction that the U.S. unemployment rate
will soon decrease to around 5%, the long-run natural rate, as the remain-
ing cyclical unemployment fades away (Lazaer and Spletzer, 2012).
In a recent economic letter from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fran-
cisco, Valletta and Kuang (2010b) lent additional support to Lazaer and
Spletzer’s findings through the use of slightly different processes. They
first looked at recent outward shifts in the Beveridge curve, which will be
discussed in greater detail toward the end of this literature review. Sec-
ondly, and similarly to Lilien (1982), they used a dispersion approach; they
took weighted standard deviations of payroll employment across indus-
tries as well as across states. Their rationality for this was that sustained
increases in the NAIRU are predicated on sector-level labor supply and de-
mand imbalances. They found huge spikes in the dispersion of unemploy-
ment rates and attributed this to a 1.25 or less percentage point increase
in the NAIRU. Having said this, they believe that these effects are likely
transitory rather than permanent. In fact, they claim that the variation of
employment gains and losses across sectors has almost returned to its pre-
recession level (Valletta and Kuang, 2010b). Conceptually linking this in-
formation back to Figure 6, they would recognize the past existence of the
short-run (orange) line but feel we are already back on the long-run (navy)
line. To them, there has been very little imbalance in the pace of employ-
ment growth. Furthermore, they feel that the recent peak in dispersion was
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similar to the peak attained during the Volcker recession of the early 1980s,
which neither contained a permanent nor large structural component (Val-
letta and Kuang, 2010b). Furthermore, the observed unemployment rate
and the NAIRU dropped to low levels during the subsequent early to mid
1980s recovery (Figure 1 and Figure 6). Keep in mind, however, that al-
though these econometricians believe most of the unemployment rate hike
was attributable to cyclical factors, other research indicates that cyclical
changes may evolve into structural unemployment in the longer term due
to skills and relationships worsening as time spent unemployed lengthens
(see DeLong 2010; Levine 2013).
Although hotly contested, many economists use the principle of path
dependence (also termed hysteresis) to argue against there being no shifts
in structural unemployment, as the above econometricians claim. In major
contrast to the above views, this theory allows for a time-variant NAIRU
and even gives reasons as to why this is a more likely representation of real
life (Ball and Mankiw, 2002). In physics, hysteresis is defined as the fail-
ure of an object to return to its original steady state after being affected by
an external force, even ex-post the force’s removal (Ikhouane and Rodel-
lar, 2007; 20). In other words, it is the dependence of a system on not only
its current surroundings, but also on its past environment. This serves to
suggest that the system, the NAIRU in this case, has more than one inter-
nal state which changes over time. In particular, Blanchard and Summers
(1986), among others (see Layard, Nickell, & Jackman 1991, page 109-12;
Ball 2009), have suggested that this concept applies to the labor market.
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By the above definition, the natural rate is dependent not only on cur-
rent labor market conditions but also on the past unemployment rate. Blan-
chard and Summers (1986) lent empirical support to this in their paper an-
alyzing the increases in the European natural rate following the disinfla-
tionary recession of the early 1980s. They found that the unemployment
rate becomes permanently higher after substantial negative shocks to the
economy. Note that this theory relies on the fact that inflationary expec-
tations are sticky due to wage rigidities and other labor market imperfec-
tions. One potential explanation for this, put forward by Layard, Nickell,
and Jackman (1991; 109-12), is that workers lose human capital by remain-
ing unemployed and, hence, become less attractive to potential employers
the longer this remains the case. This means that there remains a lasting im-
pact on the NAIRU even after the initial shock that caused the downturn in
employment disappears. The intuition behind this claim is that the NAIRU
remains higher due to the simple fact that workers are no longer as employ-
able as they were pre-recession; sustained unemployment decreases both
the market and job-searching skills of the unemployed population (Stiglitz,
1997).
Those that do believe the NAIRU permanently changes calculate it us-
ing a variety of different methods. Recall that a practical estimation of the
natural rate is difficult due to the many shocks that could influence it as
well as the uncertainty as to how much it changes over time. Hall (1979)
proposed a theoretical estimation approach that estimates the natural rate
through finding the intersection between the job finding and job separation
curves. In his model, the unemployment rate is made up of those searching
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divided by the amount in the labor force as a whole:
U =
s
s+ f
(2a)
Hence:
U =
1
1 + fs
(2b)
In these equations, s represents the proportion of people actively look-
ing for work (the job searching rate) and f represents the job finding rate.
As both equations suggest, a training scheme, teaching people how to ap-
ply for jobs or interview better, would increase the job finding rate and,
hence, lower the overall unemployment rate. A more generous unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) plan, on the other hand, would increase the job separa-
tion rate as well as discourage workers from searching for employment as
fervently. Both of these would work in the same, albeit negative, direction,
resulting in a higher unemployment rate.
There have also been previous papers that estimate and forecast the
natural rate using a Phillips curve approach. However, using this method
is extremely imprecise, involving standard errors of up to two percentage
points. Since the NAIRU has historically only fluctuated between 5.0% and
6.3% (Figure 6), these huge error bands make this method impractical in
terms of application in the policy space. This is due to the fact that, al-
though it is clearly negative, the Phillips curve relationship is not all that
tight, with points varying hugely from the regression line. Staiger, Stock,
and Watson (1997) calculate the U.S. NAIRU from an empirical Phillips
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curve specification. However, their 95% confidence intervals are so large
that even the actual unemployment rate is rarely out of the sampling inter-
val. They attribute part of this variation to not having a perfect measure of
inflation available. Regardless of the rationale, this imprecise of an estimate
means that this method does not have great practical application.
Since cyclical unemployment is the gap between the actual rate and the
natural rate, their results were not hugely useful from a policy perspective.
They acknowledged this in their study and were quick to point out that
other measures, such as the capacity utilization rate and some monetary
aggregates over longer timeframes, are stronger in forecasting inflation. In
fact, their research shows that inflation forecasts based on NAIRUs of 4.5,
5.5, and 6.5% are fairly similar due to the limited power of the natural rate
in forecasting inflation rates. The authors called attention to this idea by
stating,
“[t]he difficulty in estimating the NAIRU and its limited role
in forecasting inflation are, of course, interrelated; after all, if
the NAIRU played a more important role in forecasting infla-
tion, then its value could be pinned down with greater precision
from the data.” (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997; 47)
However, they added that while it is important ”to recognize the limita-
tions of the Phillips curve . . . knowing that there is an empirical regularity,
albeit a noisy one, between the unemployment rate and changes in inflation
should suffice” (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997) to affect policy regardless
of where the actual NAIRU lies.
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Nobel prize winner, Stiglitz preliminarily found a 1.5 percentage point
drop in the NAIRU from its 1980 peak until 1996 using the Phillips curve
methodology as well (Stiglitz, 1997). He cautioned his readers stating, “the
uncertainty surrounding this estimate, both the formal standard errors and
the uncertainty over whether we are estimating the correct model, is very
large.” (Stiglitz, 1997) It is interesting to note, however, that he attributes
this decline to three main forces: changing labor force demographics, pro-
ductivity growth, and more competitiveness within the labor and product
markets. Further, he attributes one third of this change to demographic
shifts, particularly that of baby boomers aging, resulting in a greater pro-
portion of adults being in the labor force during the 1990s as compared
to before (Stiglitz, 1997). Extending this idea to the modern day, many
baby boomers are beginning to retire, leaving a larger proportionate base
of teenagers, who have a higher collective natural rate, in the labor force.
Additionally, in a meta-analysis of eight models, all found similar de-
clines in the NAIRU over 1984-1994 using a Phillips curve specification.
However, the standard errors were so high on most of them that only three
of these could reject a null hypothesis of a constant NAIRU at the 10% sig-
nificance level (Staiger, Stock, and Watson, 1997); huge standard error bars
mean that the significance of any historical changes cannot be detected with
confidence. These examples all confirm the point that while this method
yields point estimates that vary over time, they are so imprecisely esti-
mated that they are not of much use externally.
An additional issue with the above methodology is that it assumes that
the NAIRU is fairly time-invariant and that supply shocks and the natu-
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ral rate are uncorrelated (Ball and Mankiw, 2002). To compensate for this,
Ball and Mankiw used a time-lagged Phillips curve specification and the
Hodrick-Prescott filter method. The Hodrick-Prescott filter essentially con-
sists of a linear time trend which allows the regression coefficient of the
trend to gradually change over time (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). With
this method, they were able to evaluate the short-term supply shocks of the
1970s and found that these fluctuations were related to changes in produc-
tivity. They concluded that the NAIRU increased in the 1970s, when pro-
ductivity growth slowed, and vice versa in the 1990s. Similarly to Stiglitz
(1997), they attributed the bulk of these changes to demographic shifts as
baby boomers moved through the population. To lend additional support
to this claim, they calculated a Perry-Weighted unemployment rate which
is a weighted-average of the unemployment rate for different demographic
groups assuming fixed weights, as if their respective weights at the begin-
ning of the period remained throughout the period. This method allowed
them to parse out what would have happened to the natural rate and un-
employment rate had the relative proportion of demographic groups re-
mained constant. They further hypothesized that increases in disability
insurance as well as changes in incarceration rates affected the natural rate
during these time periods. These two changes work in much the same way
in that they both serve to remove people with historically higher unem-
ployment rates from the labor force, thereby reducing the overall unem-
ployment rate and underlying NAIRU.
The next approach that has been frequently cited in the literature uti-
lizes the Okun’s law relationship. This relationship, between the NAIRU
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and full-employment output as they relate to the actual unemployment and
achieved GDP, is central to numerous monetary policy discussions. In the
short-run, this relationship displays the labor and product markets’ capa-
bilities of increasing employment growth and output without increasing in-
flation. In the long-run, it helps us determine the sustainable, equilibrium
pace of noninflationary output (Hoover, 2012; 593). While not explicitly
stated alongside Figure 4, Okun’s law can be represented by the following
equation:
(
y − ypot)× 100 = f (U − U) (3)
where (y − ypot) is the gap between actual real GDP growth, y, and
potential growth if there was full-employment, ypot. On the other side of
Equation 3, f is Okun’s coefficient resulting from a linear regression of the
output gap on the amount of cyclical unemployment. As a result, one can
calculate a natural rate using full employment output as estimated by the
CBO along with the unemployment rate and growth in real GDP from the
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Daly et al. (2012) performed a
rudimentary analysis using this methodology. Their results suggest that
the natural rate was approximately one percentage point higher than the
CBO’s estimate during the recession and immediate aftermath. One poten-
tial flaw with this process is that the CBO uses the long-term natural rate
to compute its potential output values and, thus, there may exist an endo-
geneity problem within this model. Another drawback of this approach is
that the Okun coefficient may not be stable over time. A larger issue with
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this methodology in calculating a natural rate, however, is that it must as-
sume a constant NAIRU, otherwise too many variables are changing. In
addition, this method does not allow for labor market changes or capital
inputs to have any explicit effect on the determination of the natural rate or
potential output (Horiguchi, 1992). The solution of the past has been to put
in period dummies, which allow the Okun coefficient and the natural rate
to change over time, but not so many that the available degrees of freedom
are exhausted. This is problematic because different cutoff points tend to
drastically affect the regression coefficients. Lilien’s sectoral variation ap-
proach, as discussed next, further improves on this by eliminating the need
for time dummies at all. To do this, he utilizes Barro’s measure of unantic-
ipated money growth, termed DMR in his paper, as a proxy for time-fixed
effects (Lilien, 1982).
Lilien (1982) uses sectoral variation to show that the NAIRU went up
in the 1970s. Through this approach, he estimates the degree of structural
shifts within the labor market using a measure of the annual dispersion
of employment; higher variation is associated with increased mismatch
since this indicates people are shifting into new positions in new indus-
tries. As I will discuss in the theory of unemployment section, movements
between sectors can affect the unemployment rate, especially if geography
is involved. Lilien (1982; 777) shows that, particularly in the 1970s, the ma-
jority of fluctuations in the unemployment rate were caused by movements
in the natural rate: “[a] substantial fraction of cyclical unemployment is
better characterized as fluctuations of the frictional or natural rate than as
deviations from some relatively stable natural rate.” Furthermore, he deter-
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mines that at least 50% of the unemployment fluctuations were a result of
the slow adjustment of labor supplied to shifts in employment demand be-
tween sectors (Lilien, 1982). This was a fairly novel idea in the early 1980s;
Lilien was going against the grain in that most economists of the time were
attributing the unemployment rate trends directly to cyclical unemploy-
ment resulting from business cycle fluctuations rather than movements in
the underlying long-run rate.
Lilien’s (1982) conclusions about monetary policy implications are per-
haps even more relevant to the current discussion. Because changes in the
NAIRU indicate structural, rather than cyclical, unemployment, he deter-
mines that aggregate fiscal and monetary policy would not have been an
effective remedy in the 1970s; since inadequate demand was not the under-
lying issue, the optimal course of action was minimal government stimulus
initiatives (Lilien, 1982). I extend his approach to after the Great Recession
and analyze the results with the current monetary stimulus plans in mind.
If, as Lilien found in the 1970s, shifts in the NAIRU are mostly responsible
for the higher-than-previous-recoveries unemployment rate, monetary in-
fluxes and increased quantitative easing are not the solution. If this is the
case, the unemployment rate should gradually decrease on its own, absent
any pushes from the Federal Reserve.
A more modern approach that has recently gained acclaim in the eco-
nomics literature is determining the natural rate based on movements in
the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve represents the relationship be-
tween the unemployment rate and vacancy rate and serves as a comple-
ment to the Phillips curve in analyzing the labor market; the curve appears
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to shift over time and these shifts broadly correspond to the pattern of his-
torical Phillips curve shifts (Ball and Mankiw, 2002). Beveridge curve the-
ory will be discussed later in the paper but for the purposes of this literature
review, it is imperative to note that movements along the curve tend to be
attributable to cyclical unemployment whereas shifts in the curve are rep-
resentative of increases or decreases in structural unemployment. While
this is the case, it has been found that the NAIRU tends to change by ap-
proximately half as much as the Beveridge curve shifts out horizontally
(see Orphanides and Williams, 2002). Valletta and Kuang (2010b) use a
Beveridge curve approach and find a 1.25 percentage point increase in the
NAIRU from the middle of the recession to December of 2010. While this
is the case, they think this change is transitory and that the natural rate
will soon return back to its pre-recession level. They attribute 0.8 percent-
age points of this increase to unemployment insurance benefit extensions
(Valletta and Kuang, 2010b). This appears to be a strongly recurring theme
and will be discussed further in the conclusion of this thesis. Daly et al.
(2012) found the intersection of the Beveridge curve with the long-run job
creation curve. As a result, they determine that the post-recession NAIRU
is between 5.5 and 6.6%. Like Valletta and Kuang, they see this as solely a
temporary increase and believe that the natural rate will fall back to around
5% as the cyclical recovery proceeds. That being said, they hold a slightly
longer-term view in that they feel that it will still likely persist for several
years due to remaining slack in the labor market (Daly et al., 2012). These
opinions appear to match the CBO projections presented in Figure 6, with
the short-run increases slowly fading away by approximately 2018.
Chapter 4
Theory of Unemployment
4.1 The Classical Model
In the classical model, prices and nominal wages are perfectly flexible; they
always adjust such that the equilibrium real wage (WP
∗) and employment
(L∗) remain at the point dictated by the intersection of the labor demand
and labor supply curves, at least in the long-run. The following three graph
framework (Figure 7)10 will help to illuminate the theoretical underpin-
nings of the unemployment rate.
For simplicity’s sake, a closed economy is assumed. Furthermore, all
underlying movements in prices, P , can be derived from an IS-LM/AS-AD
framework. For the equations that follow, natural logarithms were taken
in order to linearize the model: small letters refer to the natural logarithms
of variables (i.e. a = ln(A)). Figures 7a and 7b represent the labor de-
10The bulk of the methodology used, equations, and graphs are from Professor Manfred
Keils lecture notes (2013).
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mand and labor supply curves with nominal and real wages, respectively,
on the Y-axis. Figure 7c is the production function with output being a func-
tion of amount of labor input (L), capital investment (K), and technological
progress (A). For the purposes of this analysis, the production function will
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be of the Cobb-Douglas variety:
Y = AKδLγ (3a)
In logs:
y = a+ δk + γl (3b)
where delta and gamma are elasticities that lie between zero and one.
The bars over K and A in Figure 7 indicate that capital investment and
technological progress are fixed in the short-run. Since this is the case:
y = cnst+ γl (3c)
where cnst = a+ δk.
In the “classical” version of this model, there is no cyclical unemploy-
ment and unemployment only results when real wages are set above the
market-clearing level, causing there to be more job seekers than there are
open positions. This “wait unemployment” occurs is when the federal or
state minimum wage is set above the equilibrium rate. In this situation, as
depicted in Figure 8 below, the real wage rate is set such that there are more
people willing to work than the number firms are willing to hire.
First, I present the derivation of the labor demand curve as a means of
displaying the parameters it is dependent on11. Assuming firms are ra-
tional and profit-maximizing, they will demand labor only up until the
11Source: Stevenson, Muscaltelli, and Gregory (Chapter 3).
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point where the marginal benefits of hiring an additional worker equal the
marginal costs of hiring that worker. In the labor market, marginal benefits
are the differential output the last added worker produces multiplied by
the price the firm can charge for that output. The marginal cost of the last
worker is the going wage rate. Hence:
W = P × 4Y4L (4a)
Dividing both sides by price:
W
P
=
4Y
4L (4b)
with 4Y4L being the slope of the production function.
In logs, these two equations turn into:
w = p× 4Y4L (4c)
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And:
w − p = 4Y4L (4d)
Equation 4c is plotted in Figure 7a whereas Equation 4d is plotted in
panel (b) of the same figure. Because price is only on the Y-axis of Figure
7b, changes in prices cause shifts in the labor demand curve in Figure 7a
and movements along the curve in Figure 7b.
To take this one step further, I substitute the actual derivative of the
production function in for 4Y4L of Equation 4b:
W
P
=
4Y
4L = γAK
δLγ−1 (5a)
In logs:
w − p = γ + a+ δk + (γ − 1) lD (5b)
I refer to l as lD in this case because, since it was derived from the pro-
duction function, this quantity of labor represents the amount desired from
the firm-side of the market. Assuming gamma is likewise a constant, we
now have:
w − p = cnst′ + (γ − 1) lD (5c)
Solving for the amount of labor demanded by the firms, lD, we get:
lD = cnst
′′
+
1
γ − 1 (w − p) (5d)
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This validates what can be seen in Figure 7b: a decrease in prices re-
sults in an upward movement along the labor demand curve. It also serves
to confirm what we see in Figure 8: a decrease in prices without a similar
decrease in the nominal wage rate induces involuntary “wait” unemploy-
ment by decreasing the labor demanded to less than what is supplied; peo-
ple are willing to work but cannot find employment since there are fewer
vacancies at this high of a real wage.
Next, I look at the supply half of the market so that both employers and
employees are represented in this model. The labor supply curve is the set
of points for which employees maximize utility given a set of possible work
and leisure hours, subject to a budget constraint in the form of their annual
income inclusive of any non-work income. From this side of the model,
the real wage can be defined as the opportunity cost of one hour of leisure
time. Essentially, wages are the money one forgoes by choosing to leisure
rather than work. As such, the higher the real wage, the more likely one
is to choose work over leisure. This is known in the literature as the sub-
stitution effect. On the other hand, since leisure is a normal good, a higher
income, resulting from a higher wage, incentivizes people to demand more
leisure. This effect, working in the opposite direction, is termed the income
effect. The substitution effect tends to dominate when wages are lower and
the income effect takes over once wages reach a particular height. This
switch over point is different for each individual depending on the slope of
their utility curves. It is at this height that the labor supply curve becomes
backward-bending. In order to simplify my analyses, I assume that people
in the market are on the upward-sloping portion of the curve only.
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Assume the solution to this particular constraint maximization problem
is:
LS =
(
W
P
)θ
(6a)
In logs:
lS = θ (w − p) (6b)
I now substitute Equation 5c into Equation 6b:
lS = θ
(
cnst
′
+ (γ − 1) lD
)
(6c)
Since I am viewing this market through a classical lens, the economy
is always at the intersection of the labor demand and labor supply curves
(lS = l∗ = lD). As such, I combine the l’s as like-terms and isolate l:
l [1− θ (γ − 1)] = cnst′ × θ (7a)
∴ l = cnst
′ × θ
1− θ (γ − 1) = cnst
′′′
(7b)
where cnst
′′′
is just another constant.
Since all the terms in the fraction are constant, l is constant in equi-
librium as well. In other words, employment in the long-run is constant.
Of particular interest is that the equilibrium level of employment is inde-
pendent of prices. This is not to suggest that it does not attain new stable
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values as its underlying parameters change, but that it is solely affected by
the determinants of the labor demand and labor supply functions. From
the above derivation, some of the notable factors include the amounts of
capital stock and technological change, as well as the returns to labor and
capital.
The last step in this analysis results from the fact that we can approxi-
mate the unemployment rate as the difference in the log of the labor force
and the log of employment. This is because changes in variables are almost
equivalent to the difference in natural logs between the two, when values
are small. As such:
U =
LF − L
LF
≈ lf − l (8)
Based on this slight simplification, the unemployment rate is only af-
fected by parameters which affect employment, as discussed in the deriva-
tions above, and those parameters which affect the amount of people in
labor force. This confirms Friedman’s (1968) definition of the natural rate
as being a constant in an equilibrium system given a specific parametric set
of inputs.
4.2 The Keynesian Model
In the Keynesian model, on the other hand, wages and prices are sticky
in the short-run. Hence, prices do not adjust right away to ensure that
the market clears and reaches its equilibrium level. It is this above-market-
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clearing price that results in cyclical unemployment. Rather than being due
to temporary movement between jobs, this kind of unemployment is due to
fluctuations in demand. More specifically, it occurs when there is an aggre-
gate demand deficiency. This deficiency leads to a decrease in production
and, consequently, fewer employees wanted by firms. In this model, the
number of people searching for work exceeds the number of jobs available.
So, even if full employment is reached, there still exists unemployment due
to the fundamental demand shortage. It is this business cycle unemploy-
ment that is theoretically targetable through government intervention; the
central bank can influx money into the economy through the purchase of
bonds in order to stimulate aggregate demand in the short-run.
To better understand the additional parameter that causes this cycli-
cal unemployment in the Keynesian model, I will make one change to the
supply-side of the above framework, while leaving the demand-side as it
was. This modification, which Friedman came up with in his derivation
of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, is to replace real wages with
expected real wages (Friedman, 1968). Since workers know their nominal
wages due to contracts, the only thing that changes in the equation is that
prices become expectations of the near-term aggregate price level:
LS =
(
W
P e
)θ
(6c)
In logs:
lS = θ (w − pe) (6d)
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The reason that this only affects the supply-side of the labor market is
that the price suppliers are concerned about is their product selling price,
which they set. Once firm-level supply curves are determined, these can
easily be aggregated across firms to result in the aggregate labor demand
curve, and hence the market price. The fundamental difference with this
model is that employees are concerned with the expected price of the basket
of goods they typically purchase, whereas employers are only interested in
the price they can get for their product.
Repeating the calculations from the classical section, instead with Equa-
tion 6d substituted in for Equation 6b:
l = cnst
′
+
θ
1− θ (γ − 1) (p− p
e) (9a)
∴ l = l∗ + δ (p− pe) (9b)
where l∗ is the level of equilibrium unemployment if workers have cor-
rect expectations, (p = pe).
One remaining issue is how to plot the labor demand and new labor
supply curve in the same diagram, given that they now depend on real
wages and expected real wages, respectively. From Equation 6c:
LS =
(
W
P e
)θ
=
(
W
P
× P
P e
)θ
(10a)
Hence, in logs:
lS = θ [(w − p) + (p− pe)] (10b)
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Or:
(w − p) = − (p− pe) + 1
θ
× lS (10c)
According to Equation 10c, the difference between realized and expected
prices, (p − pe), essentially becomes a shift factor for the new labor supply
curve with the real wage on the Y-axis. This means that you can be away
from the natural rate only when there are price expectation errors. If actual
prices are greater than price expectations, perhaps due to an unanticipated
monetary or fiscal shock, the labor supply curve will shift right, thereby
reducing the real wage and increasing employment in the market. As such,
since the gap between realized prices and price expectations are a function
of the gap between the actual money supply and the anticipated money
supply, policy makers can affect the unemployment rate through unantic-
ipated monetary shocks to the market. These will reduce cyclical unem-
ployment. A huge take away from this model, and a major consideration
for demand policymakers, is that only surprises matter. Relating this back
to the purpose of this paper: is it very important to assess whether the per-
sistently higher unemployment rate since the 2006-09 recession is cyclical,
and therefore targetable, or not.

Chapter 5
Empirical Specification
5.1 Extension of Lilien’s (1982) model post-recession
As discussed in the theory of unemployment section, shifts in aggregate
demand affect the unemployment rate because it takes laid-off workers
time to find new jobs. Lilien (1982) determined that the amount of unem-
ployment resulting from employment demand shifts depends on the speed
with which workers are able to become reemployed. As such, if they have
strong industry attachments, adjustment to sectoral shifts tends to be slow
and causes more unemployment before the market is able to reach a new
equilibrium (Lilien, 1982). Due to this relationship, he regressed a disper-
sion measure (sigma) on the aggregate unemployment rate to assess the
impact of sectoral shifts on the unemployment rate. It is relevant to extend
this approach to today because of the large sectoral shifts that occurred
during the Great Recession. For instance, between 2006 and 2010, the gov-
ernment sector’s share of employment increased from 16.1% to 17.3%, an
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increase of 7.5%. Over the same period, education and health services’ re-
spective share of aggregate employment increased from 13.1% to 15.1%, an
increase of 15.3%. On the other end of the spectrum, manufacturing’s share
dropped from 10.4% to 8.9%, a decrease of 14.4% over this short five year
span. With the greatest relative employment change, construction employ-
ment dropped from 5.6% to 4.2% of total employment, a decrease of 25.0%.
This lends support to the idea that this recession was a “Mancession”, with
predominantly male-dominated fields hit with the bulk of layoffs. To put
these figures into perspective, construction employment has only declined
by 5.5% over the previous decade (1996-2006).
The dispersion variable, σˆ, was constructed using annual, industry-
level data12 from the Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Current Population Survey
according to the following formula:
σˆ =
[
11∑
i=1
xit
Xt
(4 log xit −4 logXt)2
] 1
2
(11)
where xit is industry-level employment in year t, and Xt is aggregate
employment in that same year.
As discussed in the theory of unemployment section, price surprises,
a direct result of monetary shocks, impact the unemployment rate. To ac-
count for this, Lilien uses Barro’s13 measure of unanticipated money policy,
12The common 11-industry NAICS classification system was used to disaggregate the
data.
13The DMR series used in Lilien (1982) was updated from Barro (1983). For my replica-
tion, I used Barro’s (1983) values of DMR for 1948-1959. This data was pulled from Lucas
and Sargent’s (Eds.) “Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice” in Barro’s chapter
on “Unanticipated Money Growth”. I then calculated the year-over-year growth of M1 and
M2 from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis from 1960-2012. Next, I regressed these
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DMR (Lilien, 1982). This value is a residual and, hence, goes to zero when
approximating long-run values of the unemployment rate. It is useful to
include in the regression framework as a proxy for time-fixed-effects (TFE).
Consequently, the regression framework Lilien (1982) used to estimate the
unemployment rate, including exogenous variables sigma and DMR, is of
the form:
Ut = β0 + β1σt −
k∑
i=0
γiDMRt−i + β2Ut−1 + β3T + εt (12)
where εt is a random disturbance term. A time trend, T , is included
in an attempt to capture national trends that may have occurred in the la-
bor market over each period analyzed. Table 1 presents estimates of two
versions of Equation 12 over Lilien’s time period (1948-1980) and an exten-
sion of his model to the present (1948-2012) using annual14 nonfarm data
from the Federal Reserve in St. Louis and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
databases. Table 2 presents four additional specifications for the period
1990-2012, along with the inclusion of a squared time trend. This period
is broken out separately in order to make it comparable to the state-level
panel and time-series regressions, for which data is only available since
1990. These will be discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
I apply the Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests on DMR, sigma, and the un-
employment rate to ensure their stationarity. I determine the optimal lag
growths on two lags of themselves as well as the lagged unemployment rate to arrive at
DMR and DMR2, values respectively. The data was originally obtained monthly and was
aggregated to annual values for use in these regressions.
14The data was originally obtained monthly and was aggregated to annual values for use
in these regressions.
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length by finding the auto regressive (AR) process of order p that min-
imizes the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The null for this test is
that the variable of interest follows a unit-root process, thereby having a
stochastic trend. Hence, a rejection of the null indicates that the variable
is stationary. With one lag, DMR rejected the null at the 1% level with a
test-statistic of -4.7. Using two lags, sigma likewise rejected the null with a
1% significance and a test-statistic of -5.9. A Dickey-Fuller test on the un-
employment rate suggested that it did not follow a stationary process over
1948 to 2012. However, using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test on
1956 to 2007, I was able to reject the null at the 5% significance level. I be-
lieve this is appropriate given that the low rates of the early 1950s and high
rates of the recent recession are likely aberrations.
Next, I ran F-tests on sigma and the unemployment rate to determine
Granger causality. Since the ADF determined that the unemployment rate
was only stationary within a smaller subset of the entire period, I used
the change in the unemployment rate rather than the unemployment rate
itself. The optimal lag length was determined by finding the AR(p) that
minimized the BIC; five lags for the change in the unemployment rate and
two lags for sigma were optimal. In the full time sample, sigma Granger-
causes the change in the unemployment rate at the 4.3% significance level,
with an F-statistic of 3.3. On the other hand, the F-statistic on the reverse
scenario is 2.1 which indicates that sigma does not Granger-cause a change
in the unemployment rate at even the 10% level.
In the first two regressions, all estimated betas are of the expected sign
and are highly significant, with the exception of DMR and lagged sigma.
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Furthermore, they fairly closely replicate the coefficients found by Lilien
(1982). The discrepancies found are likely due to Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) revisions to employment data. This becomes more evident when the
natural rate is calculated and compared to his results; there is only a minor
error band between the two. In the second pair of regressions, DMR and its
lags are not only statistically insignificant but also of the opposite sign than
expected. This may have resulted because, as some modern literature sug-
gests (see Goldfeld, 1976), M2 rather than M1 may be a stronger predictor of
modern monetary shocks due to changes in banking culture and money de-
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mand instability. In the post war period, M1 money demand over-predicts
the demand for money (Goldfeld, 1976). As a result, the growth in M2 will
be used in the post-1990 regressions exclusively. I could not use it in these
primary four regressions because M2 data from the Federal Reserve is only
available from 1959 onwards. It is interesting to note that the long-run σˆt
is not extremely sensitive to the inclusion of its lag nor on further lags of
DMR, as the minor coefficient differences between Regressions 1 and 2 and
Regressions 3 and 4 display. Lastly, none of the Breusch-Godfrey serial cor-
relation Lagrange multiplier tests of order one reject the null of there being
no auto-correlation. This is important but not unexpected given that the
lagged unemployment rate is included in all four of these regressions.
In contrast to the 1948-2012 regressions of Table 1, the signs of all coef-
ficients, including DMR2 and its lags, are of the expected sign in all four
of the 1990-2012 regressions. Sigma is also much more significant over this
time period. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the coefficient on
sigma is neither greatly impacted by the inclusion of a squared time trend
nor the same year DMR2, as seen by the minor coefficient differences be-
tween regressions 1 and 2 and regressions 3 and 4, respectively. A large
variation in the deviation of the unemployment rate is explained by these
models.
In terms of the linear versus squared time trend, I looked at the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) for regressions 1 and 2. The AIC is a measure
deals with the trade-off between the complexity and the goodness of fit of
a model. A smaller AIC is indicative of a higher quality model in terms
of there being the least information lost. The AIC of regression 1 is 23.3
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compared to 13.1 for regression 2. This suggests that a squared time trend
is a better fit for this time period, and is the reason I use it for the remainder
of the modeled equations. This is reasonable given that the period started
with the 1990 recession and recovery, lead into an expansion, and ended
with the Great Recession.
Once again, all the first order Breusch-Godfrey statistics in this set of
regressions fail to reject the null of there being no serial correlation. Due to
this, I decided against the inclusion of heteroscedasticity-consistent (HAC)
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standard errors. Moreover, I dropped DMR2t after an F-test on the coeffi-
cient of DMR2t in regression 3 resulted in a P-value of 0.68.
In terms of using these specifications to estimate a natural rate series, I
use Liliens (1982) methodology:
U =
∞∑
i=0
βi2 (β0 + β1σˆt−i + β3Tt−i) (13)
Since DMR and the error term are residuals, their infinite sum is zero
and this explains why they are excluded from natural rate calculation in
Equation 13. Furthermore, note the importance of lags in this equation;
past values greatly impact the current ones. While this is true, because β2
is between zero and one, the weight of these lags approaches zero after only
a couple lags are considered. Using Equation 13 and the coefficients from
Table 2 regression 3, I calculate the natural rate since 1992. These values are
represented in Table 3 below and as a time series plot in Figure 9.
The natural rate series shows significant movement between 1992 and
2012, tracking the actual unemployment rate reasonably well (Figure 9).
More interestingly, these results illuminate the different sources of unem-
ployment. Between 1992 and 1999, there is a fairly wide gap between the
unemployment and natural rates, with a maximum gap of 0.7 percentage
points (15.2% of the actual unemployment rate) in 1996. These deviations
from the NAIRU represent cyclical unemployment which is, therefore, tar-
getable by monetary policy. In stark contrast, over 1999 to 2012, the un-
employment rate has tracked the natural rate extremely closely which sug-
gests that real parameters affecting the underlying natural rate were driv-
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ing the changes rather than deviations from it. In fact, the correlation co-
efficient between these two series is 0.93. As mentioned throughout this
paper, it is these structural factors which the central bank cannot affect.
Putting this information in Figure 9 into context of the Fed-accepted
CBO estimates from Figure 6, the natural rate estimates predicted by this
regression are much higher; rather than hovering around 6% in 2012, my
model predicts a NAIRU as high as 8.2%. While this is the case, the natural
rate has been trending strongly downward and I imagine that its current
high level is purely transitory in nature. Given their recent tight relation-
ship, the actual unemployment rate should fall with it, even absent any
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government intervention. Even more interesting is that this figure shows
that the actual unemployment rate is already below the natural rate. This
suggests that the Federal Reserve should not stimulate aggregate demand
further. In fact, a target of 5.5% is much below the current NAIRU and
could put the U.S. in risk of increased inflation.
5.2 State-level Panel Estimation
In order to add more than just a period extension to Lilien’s work, I per-
form a state-level panel with time and state fixed effects to see whether
this lends any additional insights. It may be a more accurate specification
because at my more disaggregated level, losses in one state will not be sim-
ply counteracted by gains in another. For instance, employment in South
Dakota increased by 1.7% over 2006-2009 whereas employment in Califor-
nia decreased by 6.3% over the same period. While almost all of the states
showed declines during the recession, therefore resulting in less cancelling
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out of employment losses with gains, in other periods there were more con-
trasting trends between state-level employment that a national sigma may
not have caught. Moreover, this method will better account for geography-
related variation of people transitioning jobs between states. I used the
same specification as in Section 5.1 in panel form across states with two-
way fixed effects. Additionally, I included interaction terms to allow for
the effects of state-level trends. Annual nonfarm employment data from
BLS and state unemployment rate data from the Local Area Unemploy-
ment Statistics (LAUS) database were used. Since it is only available at the
national level, DMR fell out of the regression due to perfect multicollinear-
ity. This is the case because at the entity level there is an exact linear re-
lationship, in that the values are repeated, for each state within a specific
year. That being said, it will be included again in the state-level time series
of Section 5.3 as a proxy for TFE.
It would appear natural to run the state-level panel regressions using
Lilien’s (1982) initial specification starting in 1981. However, I performed
a Chow test to test for the presence of a structural break over the entire
sample. With an F-statistic of 2.57, it rejects the null hypothesis of stability
at the 5% significance level. This means that for my purposes, it is more
reasonable to follow a different specification beginning in 1981. However,
data limitations make this not feasible at the state-level. As such, I begin the
panel estimation in 1990, when state employment figures are fist released,
and assume that there was a structural break necessitating the use of new
coefficients.
The panels with two-way fixed effects and state-specific trends resulted
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in the coefficient on sigma falling to roughly one sixth its previous level;
the TFE absorbed most of its tangible impact. A regression of sigma against
the annual time dummies had an R-squared of 43.5%, which explains why
sigmas impact fell drastically when TFE were included. This makes sense
because, during the midst of a deep recession, one would expect states to
have similarly high sigmas within specific years, meaning that there would
not exist much state-level variation. It is due to this lack of state-level vari-
ation that the coefficient on sigma drops and loses its explanatory power.
To adjust for this, I exclude time fixed effects for the remaining two regres-
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sions using the panel specification. This has precedent in the economics
literature. For example, in their 1983 paper on surprise monetary shocks,
Barro and Gordon omitted country fixed effects due to a similar lack in
enough variation across countries (Barro and Gordon, 1983).
5.3 State-level Time Series Regressions
After dropping time fixed effects, the issue then becomes that shocks at
the state-level are no longer controlled for over time. As such, this sec-
tion improves the model by running 4815 individual state-level time series
regressions, once again including national DMR as a proxy for time fixed
effects. This means that I can display state-level NAIRUs over time. These
values can also be aggregated to the national level using state labor force
weights. This method is less restricting in that it allows betas to vary by
state. Presumably this will make the national natural rate calculation more
accurate. Again, the same specification is used across all states. Figures
10a-c display the natural rate and actual unemployment rate of the three
largest U.S. states (California, Texas, and New York) as measured by their
2012 labor force values. The constructed series at the national level from
the 48 state-level is represented in Figure 11.
Figure 10 shows the differences between states in terms of the amount
of structural versus cyclical unemployment that make up their respective
unemployment rates. The unemployment rates of California and Texas had
fairly high cyclical components until the early 2000s, since which point both
15Hawaii and Alaska were excluded because they tend to be anomalous in terms of trend-
ing with the rest of the mainland United States.
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of their unemployment rates have closely tracked their natural rates. It
seems that New York, on the other hand, has had a persistently large cycli-
cal component to its unemployment rate, with significant and consistent
deviations from the natural rate over all years in the sample. This may
be due to the fact that the labor market in New York is extremely com-
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petitive, with more workers willing to work at the going wage than there
are jobs available. This suggests that perhaps targeted monetary stimulus
in specific states may have greater impact on reducing the national unem-
ployment rate.
Next I aggregate the 48 state-level NAIRUs by their respective labor
force counts. In recent research, Campello, Galvao, and Juhl suggest that
aggregating lower level data may produce more efficient estimates. In their
2013 working paper, they show that averaging firm-level betas is superior
to looking at market betas in aggregate to begin with, assuming certain
correlations hold (Campello, Galvao, and Juhl, 2013). They took simple
averages in their analysis. However, since the size of the labor force varies
so much between states, with California holding roughly 13% of the U.S.
population and labor force, I decided to weight by labor force rather than
giving each state NAIRU equal weight.
Figure 11 is interesting in that it shows that slightly more cyclical un-
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employment may exist than the national-level regression (Figure 9) indi-
cates. It suggests that there was considerable cyclical unemployment in the
early 1990s as well as towards the end of the recent recession. One com-
monality that Figure 9 and Figure 11 share though is that, as of 2012, the
unemployment rate has reached the natural equilibrium rate. Additionally,
the NAIRU is trending downward. Thus, assuming this trend continues, at
least over the next few years, the unemployment rate should fall with it,
even without additional fiscal spending.
Chapter 6
Beveridge Curve Theory
The Beveridge curve has been a popular research tool in the recent struc-
tural versus cyclical unemployment debate. The curve itself tracks the re-
lationship between the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate over time
(Franz, 1992; 3). It is downward sloping because during periods of eco-
nomic contraction, the unemployment rate increases while the vacancy rate
goes down as firms reduce the number of openings and the job search be-
comes more competitive (Beveridge, 1944). As mentioned briefly in the
literature review, movements along the curve are interpreted as cyclical
movements in labor demand whereas outward or inward shifts of the curve
represent frictional unemployment changes. The second scenario reflects a
reduced efficiency in matching workers to jobs. All else equal, a decline in
job matching efficiency will raise the structural level of unemployment, and
hence the natural rate (Ball and Mankiw, 2002). In other words, for a given
level of vacancies, workers have a more difficult time finding a job they de-
sire. From the firms perspective, on the other hand, employers have more
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trouble finding suitable workers for each given level of the unemployment
rate.
Using data from BLS’ JOLTS, Figure 12 displays the Beveridge curve
since December 2000. First, this figure shows that there have been move-
ments along the historically-defined curve, suggestive of some cyclical un-
employment. Additionally, structural shifts are evident in that there has
been a significant rightward shift. The orange and purple dashed trend
lines show the mean relationship before and after August of 2009, respec-
tively. As one can see, the curve appears to have shifted outwards, with a
horizontal gap as large as 2.6 percentage points in certain months. This is
indicative of structural unemployment changes. While this is the case, past
research (see Valletta and Kuang, 2010a) indicates that the NAIRU tends
to only move by half as much as the Beveridge curve shifts outward. This
means that Figure 12 suggests an approximate maximum of a 1.3 percent-
age point increase in the natural rate since August 2009. While this is the
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case, my linear trend line analysis may be too rudimentary of a method-
ology. Research by Daly et al. (2012) suggests that horizontal shifts in the
Beveridge curve are not uniform, but instead larger at lower levels of the
job vacancy rate. Perhaps curved trend lines which are steeper at higher
job vacancy rates would better serve to address this point. While not per-
fect, this figure still brings to light an important point: even though not
as extreme of an increase as the sectoral variance approach suggests, this
is still more of a NAIRU increase than Bernanke and the Federal Reserve
acknowledge.

Chapter 7
Explanations
Both the sectoral variance and Beveridge curve methods point to there be-
ing a higher structural rate of unemployment. But why has this change
resulted? I will now consider three potential causes common in the re-
cent empirical literature, as well as how they would impact the NAIRU.
The first of these is a mismatch between labor demanded and supplied
across sectors and geographies. This rationale is predicated on there being
imbalances in labor supply and demand across skill sets, industries, and
geographies (Daly et al., 2012) which may be due to a shift in the current
demographic makeup of the labor force; as baby boomers retire, there is a
larger relative proportion of teenagers in the labor force than before.
Similar to the unemployment rate always remaining above zero due
to people transitioning between jobs, there must always exist a certain
amount of mismatch: the vacancy rate will never fall to zero. Having said
that, more mismatch than usual decreases labor market efficiency since it
becomes harder for the unemployed to find open positions as well as more
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costly for firms to fill vacancies (Daly et al., 2012). Relating this back to the
sectoral variance specifications, a large dispersion in employment across
sectors is an indication of mismatch in that it suggests an uneven distribu-
tion in job gains and losses. This is frequently cited as a key cause of natural
rate increases due to the fact that retraining workers for new jobs requires
time and money. Due to diverse retraining needs and the relative will-
ingness of the workforce to shift to new industries, each industry-specific
demand shift will affect the NAIRU by different amounts. For instance,
Barnichon, Elsby, Hobijn, & Aysegu¨l Sahin (2011) propose that the con-
struction industry had the greatest effect in shifting the Beveridge curve
during the Great Recession. This all being said, the effects of mismatch are
most likely transitory in nature and its current path indicates that it is not
likely to have a persisting impact on the NAIRU (Daly et al., 2012). This
is further supported by the declining trend of the natural rate in Figures 9
and 12.
Another plausible explanation for the higher natural rate is the exten-
sion of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. As of late 2009, the un-
employed were able to remain on UI for 99 weeks. These extensions are
likely to reduce job search intensity in that they soften the blow of losing
a job and provide a two-year income stream (Chetty, 2008). During the re-
cent recession, unemployment duration approximately doubled (Valletta
and Kuang, 2010b). If one assumes this doubling was caused wholly by
the benefit extensions, then they increased the unemployment rate by 0.8
percentage points (Daly et al., 2012). As these extension provisions expire,
however, this effect is likely to dissipate.
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Lastly, I consider the impacts of uncertainty on raising the natural rate.
In the more risky post-recession climate, firms are more uncertain about
their current and future operating environments. Such uncertainty erodes
business confidence and so depresses hiring (Bloom, 2009). Moreover, it
may also make firms more selective about filling vacancies and may in-
crease the “contractor” or temporary workforce. These effects both serve
to reduce the amount of vacancies posted, thereby shifting the Beveridge
curve up for each level of the unemployment rate. Because this uncertain
climate is not likely to persist as we climb further out of the recession, its
effect on the natural rate is not likely to be long-term.

Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
This paper analyses whether or not the natural rate of unemployment has
risen. Since monetary and fiscal spending are intended only to alleviate
cyclical unemployment and can be extremely costly if over-applied, the re-
sults of this discussion shed light on how the Federal Reserve should opti-
mally act in the coming months. Although an in-depth review of the value
of current specific policies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is still valu-
able as a tool to better understand general monetary policy implications.
My results suggest that during the post-2001 recession recovery, the un-
employment rate contained a markedly higher cyclical component. In stark
contrast, the majority of the current high post-recession unemployment
rate is structural in nature and could not have been lowered through the
increased use of aggregate demand-stimulating policies. Furthermore, it
was not until 2008 that there was a cyclical gap at all. This is not to say that
these policies did not delay or prevent some of the cyclical unemployment
that may have occurred had it been absent. Overall, a low level of demand
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in the economy was not the major issue but a shift in “real” factors was,
namely a movement in underlying natural rate. As such, monetary policy
should not have been the prescribed cure. This is even truer now since the
unemployment rate is finally below the natural rate; there remains no fur-
ther slack in the labor market for these policies to have any tangible effect.
Given this current state, further large-scale stimulus are not expected to
reduce the unemployment rate further than it would move on its own, as
the natural rate slowly comes down. The natural rate is expected to slowly
decline given that all its notable causes, as analyzed above, are likely tran-
sitory in nature. The current inability of both monetary and fiscal stimuli
to reduce structural unemployment does not mean that all policy measures
are unhelpful. Directed policies toward reducing job mismatch or retrain-
ing those who are part of the long-term unemployed portion of the labor
force may be beneficial; the effect of policies like these should be the topic
of further research.
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